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INTRODUCTION
The pornography industry generates billions of dollars of reve-
nue annually. The industry relies heavily on protection from copy-
right law in order to distribute its materials without them being freely
taken by others.1 In other words, copyright law currently operates
as an economic incentive to pornographers.2
Unfortunately, this lucrative industry has negative effects on
gender equality. Pornography promotes harmful gender roles for
both women and men.3 Women are portrayed as merely sexual objects
who enjoy any type of penetration imaginable, even if it is rape.
They are objectified and dehumanized. Men are shown as animalis-
tic, performance-based, and without morals. As a whole, pornogra-
phy can lead to behavioral, psychological, and social problems.4
Beyond the social harms to both men and women, the performers
themselves suffer physical harms.5 As a form of prostitution, filmed
pornography contributes to the demand for trafficking, and many
women are coerced into the industry.6
* JD, Rutgers Law School, May 2017.
1. See infra Part II.
2. See id.
3. See infra Section I.A.
4. See id.
5. See infra Section I.B.
6. See id.
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The government’s denial of copyright protection to speech based
on content would potentially violate the First Amendment.7 However,
the Supreme Court has made clear that not all content deserves free
speech protections. Rather, “obscene” materials, as described in Miller
v. California,8 are not protected under the First Amendment.9
This Article argues that pornography is an actual problem that
warrants denial of copyright protection as a method to disincen-
tivize pornographers. Part I sets forth the harms that pornography
causes to men and women, including both social harms to the general
public and physical harms to the actors in pornography. In par-
ticular, Part I shows that pornography has debilitating and back-
ward effects on gender equality as it enforces harmful gender roles.
Part II explains that the current success of pornography is due
to the protection it is granted in copyright law. The very purpose of
federal copyright protection was to serve as an incentive to bring
ideas into the free-speech marketplace. However, as long as pornog-
raphy is granted copyright protection, copyright law also operates
as a catalyst to pornography’s negative effects.
Part III describes the law’s current basis for granting copyright
protection to pornography, noting that obscenity is not currently a
defense to copyrightability. Intending to propose an amendment to
the Copyright Act that would exclude obscene materials, this Part
recognizes that a denial of copyright protection may violate the First
Amendment. Therefore, First Amendment obscenity law, as set
forth by the Supreme Court in Miller, is analyzed so that a proposed
amendment may be consistent with the First Amendment. This would
resolve the potential impasse between an obscenity exception to
copyright law and free speech concerns.
For that reason, Part IV posits that a solution to the problem—
that copyright operates as an incentive to pornography—would be
for Congress to amend the Copyright Act. This amendment, which is
intended to apply to only filmed works, rather than still pictures,10
would create an exclusion for obscene materials that is consistent
with the First Amendment’s definition of obscenity. In particular,
this Part suggests that Congress should craft an amendment that
codifies a workable, objective version of the Miller test. If the Miller
7. See infra Section III.B.
8. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23–24 (1973).
9. See infra Section III.C.
10. There are two reasons why this proposal is intended to only target filmed pornog-
raphy. First, it is difficult to show that the harms that result from filmed pornography
also result from pornographic still photos. See infra Sections I.A, I.B (harms of pornog-
raphy). Second, it is extremely diff icult to craft a test that could apply to photographs,
as opposed to f ilmed works.
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test is reworked into an objective framework, it would be easily
applied by courts and could be used to deny copyright protection to
some pornographic works. I suggest that this new objective test con-
sider the percentage of the work that is composed of explicit sexual
activity. This new test would not violate the First Amendment as
long as this objective test is within the intent of the Miller test. This
is a way that copyright law could be used as a step forward for
gender equality since less protection for pornography results in less
economic incentives to produce it.
I. PORNOGRAPHY’S NEGATIVE EFFECTS ON GENDER EQUALITY
Men and women are bombarded with pornography. As one sci-
entist attempting to research the effects of pornography stated: “ ‘We
started our research seeking men in their 20s who had never con-
sumed pornography. . . . We couldn’t find any.’ ”11 Unfortunately, the
influx of pornography into American culture has not been harmless.
Pornography promotes dangerous gender roles: men are to control
women; women are to be subordinate to men and accept the abuse.12
In pornography, this is all done in a way that makes the inequality
look glamorous. Behind the scenes, however, real women are being
prostituted and coerced into the pornography industry, and their
health is risked by a lack of protective measures. While gay pornog-
raphy presents its own unique set of social and physical harms to
the actors, this Article will focus on the harmful effects of pornogra-
phy in which women are made the subjects of the sexual acts by men.
Additionally, this Article considers pornography only in the context
of filmed works, rather than photographed or animated images.
A. Social Harms to Men and Women
Pornography is harmful to gender equality since it normalizes
the degradation and subordination of women to men.13 It places
women in an inferior status based on their gender.14 Catharine
MacKinnon argues that pornography is, therefore, a form of “sex
discrimination because its victims . . . are selected . . . on the basis
11. Jonathan Liew, All men watch porn, scientists f ind, TELEGRAPH (Dec. 2, 2009,
1:22 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/sex/6709646/All-men-watch-porn-scientists
-f ind.html [http://perma.cc/KQ2N-N8VR] (quoting Professor Simon Lajeunesse).
12. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV.
CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 1, 58 (1985).
13. See id. at 17.
14. Id. at 27.
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of their gender.”15 Since pornography is widely consumed by men,16
the concern is that men treat women based on their view of women,
and that view can be shaped by pornography.17
One way in which pornography is harmful to women’s equality
is that it promotes the view that women’s bodies are nothing more
than a commodity to be used.18 This view is harmful to both men and
women. It teaches men who watch pornography how to treat women,
namely, to use and abuse them.19 It teaches women that their role is
“to tolerate that abuse.”20 In the fantasy world of pornography, in-
equality is sexualized by making rape, battery, and abuse all look
sexy.21 In a study conducted of 304 top-selling pornographic scenes,
88.2% of the scenes contained physical aggression and 48.7% of the
scenes contained verbal aggression.22 It is routine for a woman to be
gagged until the point she is tearing and choking, and to be ejacu-
lated, urinated, and defecated on.23 All this humiliation is made to look
normal and acceptable under the guise of pornography.24
15. Id. In other words, but for their sex, the victim would not be treated in the way
they are in pornography. Id.
16. While the number of women who view pornography is growing, men are still
much more likely to look at porn than women. COVENANT EYES, PORNOGRAPHY STATIS-
TICS 9 (2015); Pornography Use Is a Growing Trend Among Women, NET NANNY (May 21,
2014), https://www.netnanny.com/blog/pornography-use-is-a-growing-trend-among-women
[https://perma.cc/Q3BU-WNAJ].
17. One example of the way that pornography has shaped the sexual culture is the
prominence of anal sex, which was f irst introduced in pornography in the mid-90s. Jakob
Pastötter, Pornography and Power, DRJUDITHREISMAN.COM (Sept. 5, 2010), http://www
.drjudithreisman.com/archives/2010/09/pornography_and.html [http://perma.cc/D4A3
-X68S] (transcript of a presentation given by Professor Pastötter). In a study conducted
in the 1940s, Alfred Kinsey concluded “not even gay men practiced anal sex frequently.”
Id. However, only 15 years after it was introduced into pornography, anal sex was prac-
ticed by 40% of men ages 25 to 44, and 35% of women in that same age group. BRENDA
ZURITA, CONCERNED WOMEN FOR AM., SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES: THE COST OF
FREE LOVE 9, http://www.cwfa.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/CWA_STDs-The-Cost-of
-Free-Love_2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/KSS8-NZZU]. But see Liew, supra note 11 (stating
pornography did not change men’s perceptions of women, but men instead “discarded
material[s] they found offensive or distasteful.” ).
18. See MacKinnon, supra note 12, at 19.
19. MELISSA FARLEY, PORNOGRAPHY, PROSTITUTION, & TRAFFICKING: MAKING THE
CONNECTIONS 3 (2015), http://prostitutionresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Por
nography-prostitution-trafficking.pdf [http://perma.cc/YM2A-VHS7]; see also MacKinnon,
supra note 12, at 18 (“Men treat women as who they see women as being. Pornography
constructs who that is.” ).
20. FARLEY, supra note 19.
21. MacKinnon, supra note 12, at 16–18.
22. Ana J. Bridges et al., Aggression and Sexual Behavior in Best-Selling Pornography
Videos: A Content Analysis Update, 16 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1065, 1065 (2010).
23. See JANICE SHAW CROUSE & BRENDA ZURITA, BEVERLY LAHAYE INST., 10 HARMS
OF PORNOGRAPHY, http://concernedwomen.org/images/content/CWA_10-Harms-of-Pornog
raphy.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6F4-VQ3K].
24. See id.
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Not only are the women in pornography dehumanized, but the
men are as well. Men are portrayed as animalistic and without any
morals.25 Pornography constructs the image that in order to be a
“man,” they must be able to perform in the way that porn stars do.26
Additionally, pornography tells men that they are supposed to
dominate women and should be able to control women in order to
fulfill their wishes.27 The danger with this construction is that while
“[p]ornography’s world of equality is a harmonious and balanced
place,” in the real world, “[i]t [only] eroticizes hierarchy, [and] it sex-
ualizes inequality.” 28
Another reason that pornography is harmful to women is that
the content that men view in pornography can be translated into
aggression or coercion in men’s real relationships. A European survey
of 4,564 youths determined that “[b]oys’ [use] of sexual coercion and
abuse [in their personal relationships] was significantly associated
with regular viewing of online pornography.” 29 Furthermore, in
another study, men who were shown a sexually violent film “ob-
tained higher scores on scales measuring [the] acceptance of both
interpersonal violence and the rape myth when compared with
males who viewed either a physically violent or a neutral film.” 30
Other studies have shown that men’s “frequent pornography use [can
be associated with] sexually aggressive behaviors, particularly . . .
for men at high risk for sexual aggression.” 31 Other material effects
of pornography on men and women can include divorce. Studies
25. S. Hite, The Uncelebrated Beauty of Men’s Sexuality, INDYPENDENT (May 14,
2009), https://indypendent.org/2009/05/the-uncelebrated-beauty-of-mens-sexuality [https://
perma.cc/J3JG-JS7P].
26. See id.
27. MacKinnon, supra note 12, at 17–18.
28. Id.
29. Nicky Stanley et al., Pornography, Sexual Coercion and Abuse and Sexting in
Young People’s Intimate Relationships: A European Study, J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE
1, 1–2 (2016). This study, which was conducted on “young people aged 14 to 17 in f ive
European countries,” additionally determined that “boys who regularly watched online
pornography were significantly more likely to hold negative gender attitudes.” Id.
30. Mary Anne Layden, Pornography and Violence: A New Look at the Research, in
THE SOCIAL COSTS OF PORNOGRAPHY 60 (James R. Stoner, Jr. & Donna M. Hughes eds.,
2010). Layden defines the term “rape myth” as: “a set of beliefs that women are re-
sponsible for rape, like to be raped, want to be raped, and suffer few negative outcomes
because of it.” Id. at 59. See also Drew A. Kingston et al., Pornography Use and Sexual
Aggression: The Impact of Frequency and Type of Pornography Use on Recidivism Among
Sexual Offenders, 34 AGGRESSIVE BEHAV. 341, 341 (2008) (f inding that in a study of 341
child molesters, “pornography [use] added significantly to the prediction of recidivism.”).
But see David Lee, What is the influence of pornography on rape?, CALCASA (Mar. 19,
2010), http://www.calcasa.org/2010/03/what-is-the-influence-of-pornography-on-rape
[https://perma.cc/8LP9-HRGT] (presenting two research papers that reach opposite
conclusions on whether pornography has any influence on rape).
31. Neil M. Malamuth et al., Pornography and Sexual Aggression: Are There Reliable
Effects and Can We Understand Them?, 11 ANN. REV. SEX RES. 26, 26 (2000).
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indicated that roughly fifty percent of divorces result at least in part
by pornography use of one spouse.32
B. Physical Harms to the Performers
“To viewers, pornography can appear a fantasy world of pleasure”
for all of its participants.33 But “[t]o those who create and participate
in making [the] pornography, however, their experiences are often
flooded with drugs, disease, slavery, trafficking, rape and abuse.” 34
While men who participate in gay pornography are often abused in
the same way as women are in heterosexual pornography,35 this sec-
tion of the Article will focus primarily on the harms to the women who
act in pornographic films. Pornography is harmful to the women per-
formers for three reasons. First, pornography is inherently linked to
prostitution and contributes to the demand for international sex traf-
ficking.36 Second, many women who willingly enter the industry are
coerced and manipulated into performing acts they did not consent
to.37 And finally, a lack of regulation in the production of pornography
risks all of the performers to a myriad of sexual diseases.38
The institutions of pornography, prostitution, and trafficking
overlap and are often indistinguishable.39 Pornography can be seen
as a form of legal prostitution.40 “A typical dictionary definition of
32. Dr. Jill Manning reported in 2004, before the United States Senate, that “56 percent
of divorce cases involved one party having an obsessive interest in pornographic websites.”
Kevin B. Skinner, Is Porn Really Destroying 500,000 Marriages Annually?, PSYCHOLOGY
TODAY (Dec. 12, 2011), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/inside-porn-addiction/201
112/is-porn-really-destroying-500000-marriages-annually [https://perma.cc/Q8M9-UG8H].
33. The Porn Industry’s Dark Secrets, FIGHT THE NEW DRUG (Aug. 4, 2014), https://
web.archive.org/web/20160910032317/http://f ightthenewdrug.org/the-porn-industrys
-dark-secrets [https://perma.cc/DJ5V-FB8J].
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Christopher N. Kendall, The Harms Of Gay Male Pornography: A Sex
Equality Perspective, in PORNOGRAPHY: DRIVING THE DEMAND IN INTERNATIONAL SEX
TRAFFICKING 153, 161 (David E. Guinn ed., 2007).
36. See The Porn Industry’s Dark Secrets, supra note 33.
37. Mary Rose Somarriba, The Porn Industry Is Abusive, and These Women Are
Telling It Like It Is, VERILY (Aug. 5, 2015), https://verilymag.com/2015/08/porn-industry
-playboy-mansion-sex-traff icking-belle-knox-rashida-jones-holly-madison [https://perma
.cc/HD9R-VHRU].
38. See infra Part IV.
39. See, e.g., Esohe Aghatise, Sex Traff icking, Prostitution & Pornography—Different
Aspects of Sexual Violence, in PORNOGRAPHY: DRIVING THE DEMAND IN INTERNATIONAL
SEX TRAFFICKING 43, 43 (David E. Guinn ed., 2007) (Pornography and prostitution are
“two sides of the same coin.” “Trafficking and prostitution are literally embodied in the
use of women . . . for commercial physical and photographic sexual exploitation. Pornog-
raphy is embodied in the production of material . . . which sexually objectif ies the human
body, ‘combining sex . . . behaviour with abuse or degradation in a manner that appears
to endorse, condone or encourage such behaviour.’ ” ).
40. See Julie Bindel, The Dangers of False Distinctions Between Pornography,
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a prostitute is a person ‘who engages in sexual intercourse for
money.’ ” 41 “Therefore, by definition, [the women in pornography]
are also . . . prostituted women.” 42 The only distinguishing feature
between illegal prostitution and legal pornography is that the sexual
intercourse is being recorded by a camera. As argued by Catharine
MacKinnon, pornography and prostitution are indistinguishable.43
She posits that even though “the sexually used” in pornography are
transported digitally and therefore make the transaction seem more
distanced, “it is no less real a commercial act of sex for any of the peo-
ple involved.”44 As one john admitted, “Yes, the woman in pornography
is a prostitute. They’re prostituting right before the cameras. They’re
getting money from a film company rather than individuals.” 45
It is not uncommon for a woman who experiences pornography,
prostitution, or trafficking to experience all three.46 If a prostituted
woman is moved from one part of the country to another by her
pimp by force, fraud, or coercion,47 she is trafficked.48 It is also
highly likely that the same women will, at some stage, be used by
her pimp in pornography.49 In fact, in one study conducted by Melissa
Farley of 854 prostituted women in nine countries (including the
United States), forty-nine percent of the women reported “that por-
nography was made of them while they were in prostitution.” 50 The
Prostitution and Trafficking, in PORNOGRAPHY: DRIVING THE DEMAND IN INTERNATIONAL
SEX TRAFFICKING 62, 67 (David E. Guinn ed., 2007) (noting that pornography cannot be
produced without prostituted women); see also FARLEY, supra note 19, at 1 (quoting one
survivor of prostitution who explained, “ ‘Pornography is prostitution that is legalized
as long as someone gets to take pictures.’ ” ).
41. Diana E. H. Russell, The Damaging Effects Of Exposure To Child Pornography,
in PORNOGRAPHY: DRIVING THE DEMAND IN INTERNATIONAL SEX TRAFFICKING 179, 180
(David E. Guinn ed., 2007).
42. Id.
43. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography as Trafficking, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 993,
994–1001 (2005).
44. Id. at 997 (quoting Melissa Farley, “Renting an Organ for Ten Minutes”: What
Tricks Tell Us About Prostitution, Pornography, and Trafficking, Conference Proceedings,
“Pornography: Driving the Demand in International Sex Trafficking,” International Hu-
man Rights Law Institute of DePaul University, Chicago, Illinois, Mar. 14, 2005, at 5).
45. Id.
46. Bindel, supra note 40, at 62.
47. Notably, “[m]ore than 80% of the time, women in the sex industry are under pimp
control.” See FARLEY, supra note 19, at 1.
48. Bindel, supra note 40, at 62. Human trafficking is a broad and complex issue,
encompassing many forms of exploitation and means of achieving that exploitation that
go beyond the scope of this Article. For a broader understanding and definition, see
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime art. 3(a), Nov. 15, 2000, 2237 U.N.T.S. 319.
49. Id.
50. Melissa Farley, “Renting an Organ for Ten Minutes:” What Tricks Tell Us about
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prostituted women who had pornography made of them “had signifi-
cantly more severe symptoms of [post-traumatic stress disorder]
than did [prostituted] women who did not have pornography made
of them.” 51 One organization that helps women leave prostitution
reported that 30% of their clients had been used in pornography at
some point.52
“As with all prostitution, the women . . . in pornography are, in
the main, not there by choice but because of a lack of choices.” 53 For
women who are under the control of a pimp, “[t]hese women are
often [made] to engage in highly sadistic and repugnant sex acts
that less oppressed women in the pornography industry are reluc-
tant to perform.” 54 Furthermore, many of the women who are in-
volved in both pornography and prostitution do not get to keep the
money earned from pornography, but rather, must surrender it to
their pimps.55
Not only are the same women who are used in pornography the
same women who are often prostituted and trafficked, but the
pornography itself drives the demand for prostitution, which in turn
drives the demand for trafficking in order to supply the women.56
Melissa Farley argues that “[p]ornography is men’s rehearsal for
prostitution” since “[p]ornography is cultural propaganda which
drives home the notion that women are prostitutes.” 57 In her same
study, forty-seven percent of prostituted women reported that they
“were upset by [johns’] attempts to make them do what the [johns]
had previously seen in pornography.” 58 Since men who consume
Prostitution, Pornography, and Traff icking, in PORNOGRAPHY: DRIVING THE DEMAND IN
INTERNATIONAL SEX TRAFFICKING 144, 145 (David E. Guinn ed., 2007).
51. Id. at 146.
52. See Vednita Carter, Racism and Porn, in PORNOGRAPHY: DRIVING THE DEMAND IN
INTERNATIONAL SEX TRAFFICKING 213, 213 (David E. Guinn ed., 2007) (reporting that out
of the 425 women helped by Breaking Free, an organization “that helps women . . . leave
systems of prostitution,” 30% of them had been used in pornography); Chyng F. Sun, The
Fallacies of Fantasies, in PORNOGRAPHY: DRIVING THE DEMAND IN INTERNATIONAL SEX
TRAFFICKING 233, 239 (David E. Guinn ed., 2007) (reporting “that 40% of [Breaking
Free’s] clients ha[d] been involved in pornography . . . often coerced by their pimps.”).
53. MacKinnon, supra note 43, at 995. For a list of the factors that contribute to the
lack of choice, see infra note 60.
54. Russell, supra note 41, at 180.
55. Id.
56. MacKinnon, supra note 43, at 999 (“[T]he pornography industry, in production,
creates demand for prostitution, hence for traff icking, because it is itself a form of
prostitution and traff icking. As a form of prostitution, pornography creates demand for
women and children to be supplied for sexual use to make it, many of whom are traf-
f icked to f ill that demand. The pornographers then traff ic these same people in turn in
various mediated forms.”).
57. Farley, supra note 50, at 145.
58. Id. See also Ken Franzblau, Slavefarm, Sex Tours And The Pimp John T.: Using
Pornography To Advance Trafficking, Sex Tourism, And Prostitution, in PORNOGRAPHY:
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pornography often want the prostitute to perform the degrading acts
they have witnessed in pornography, young prostitutes are frequently
trained by being forced to view pornography by their pimps.59
The second reason that women in pornography are harmed is
that even the women who willingly enter the industry, rather than
acting under the control of a pimp, are coerced and manipulated into
performing acts to which they did not consent.60 While the pornogra-
phy industry may look glamorous on the outside, “manipulation is
often used to lure women into it.” 61 Unfortunately, a common prac-
tice experienced by women in pornography is “that formally agreed-
upon terms change very frequently on porn sets” when the woman
feels as if she does not have the option to decline.62 One former pornog-
raphy actress explained that amateur porn actresses will sign on to
a porn scene as it is described to them, for a certain amount of money,
but will then be forced to do something else while the cameras roll.63
She also describes instances where “her agent intentionally [with-
held] details about a porn shoot until she had [already] committed
to it,” such as that the man she would have sex with was 50 years
old, and by the time she found out “she felt her hands were tied.” 64
DRIVING THE DEMAND IN INTERNATIONAL SEX TRAFFICKING 261, 261–73 (David E. Guinn
ed., 2007) (describing the link between pornography and sex tourism because sex tourists
use pornography to successfully advertise to men).
59. Janice Shaw Crouse, Pornography and Sex Trafficking, TOWNHALL (May 19,
2008, 3:19 PM), https://townhall.com/columnists/janiceshawcrouse/2008/05/19/pornography
-and-sex-trafficking-n994805 [https://perma.cc/3TBY-XU7B]; Fight the New Drug, Porn’s
Dirty Little Secret, TO STOP THE TRAFFICK (Jan. 8, 2014), https://tostopthetraffick.word
press.com/2014/01/08/porns-dirty-little-secret [https://perma.cc/X4AH-YPKX]; MacKinnon,
supra note 43, at 999.
60. Somarriba, supra note 37. However, it should be noted that these women are
often faced with a lack of choices. MacKinnon, supra note 43, at 995. Specif ically, “[t]he
same factors that compel women into prostitution . . . also compel women into pornog-
raphy.” Farley, supra note 50, at 147 (discussing that those factors include “poverty,
racism, childhood physical and sexual abuse, sexual harassment, and abandonment”);
FARLEY, supra note 19 (arguing that “[t]he same oppressive experiences . . . [which include]
[c]hildhood abuse and neglect, a lack of quality education and job training opportunities,
culturally mainstreamed misogyny, racism and poverty—all coerce women into [pornog-
raphy and prostitution]”).
61. Somarriba, supra note 37.
62. Id.
63. Id. See also Fight the New Drug, supra note 59 (quoting a former pornography
actress, Regan Starr: “Most of the girls start crying because they’re hurting so bad . . . . I
couldn’t breathe. I was being hit and choked. I was really upset and they didn’t stop.
They kept filming. [I asked them to turn the camera off] and they kept going.”).
64. Somarriba, supra note 37. In a similar fashion, former performer Shelley Lubben
said that she was “intimidated into doing scenes” she had not agreed to beforehand.
Jonathon Van Maren, This Former Porn Star Is Exposing Porn’s Secrets: And It Should
Make You Very Uncomfortable, LIFE SITE NEWS (May 11, 2015), http://www.crossmap
.com/blogs/this-former-porn-star-is-exposing-porns-secrets-and-it-should-make-you-very
-uncomfortable-6372 [https://perma.cc/YUG6-YARD]. Lubben said that if she objected,
the pornographers would threaten not to pay her, to sue her, to send her pornography
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Most pornography portrays the woman as smiling and enjoying
the brutality that is inflicted on her.65 That is often because “[w]ith
some editing and off-screen coercion, pornographers can make it
look like what’s happening onscreen is being enjoyed[;] [b]ut the un-
cut version is a different story.”66 Another former pornography actress,
Jersey Jaxin, explained that many of the performers rely on drugs
in order to cope with the way they are being treated.67 She claims
that seventy-five percent of porn performers are using drugs in
order to numb themselves.68 These women are forced to continue
smiling or risk upsetting the pornographers and being punished for
doing a bad job.69
Finally, a lack of regulation in the production of pornography
risks all of the performers to a myriad of sexual diseases. Most por-
nography is filmed in California, where condoms are not required
to be worn on set, with the exception of Los Angeles County.70 An HIV
scare in the pornography industry sparked a call for California to
mandate the use of condoms in order to protect the performers.71
“Since August [of 2013], at least four performers have tested positive
for HIV,” forcing the Free Speech Coalition, the adult film industry’s
trade association, to halt production three separate times.72 At least
three of the performers contracted the virus from other performers
while on set.73 In one case, performer Cameron Bay contracted HIV
after filming a scene in which her partner’s penis was bleeding, and
the director chose to continue filming, despite the fact that the actor
to her family in order to ruin her reputation, to take away her f inances, and physically
hurt her. Id.
65. Fight the New Drug, supra note 59.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. Jersey Jaxin goes on to explain the physical toll the business takes on the
performer’s body: “ ‘You’re bruised. You have black eyes. You’re ripped. You’re torn. You
have your insides coming out.’ ” Id.
69. MacKinnon, supra note 43, at 995 n.12 (quoting former pornography actress
Linda Boreman: “ ‘I never experienced any sexual pleasure, not one orgasm, nothing. I
learned how to fake pleasure so I wouldn’t get punished for doing a bad job.’ ”).
70. See California workplace safety board rejects mandatory condoms for porn actors,
FOX NEWS (Feb. 19, 2016), http://www.foxnews.com/health/2016/02/19/california-work
place-safety-board-rejects-mandatory-condoms-for-porn-actors.html [https://perma.cc
/2928-3UD6] (discussing California determination on condoms).
71. See Kathleen Miles, Yet Another HIV-Positive Porn Performer Leads To Third
Shutdown, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 25, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12
/06/fourth-hiv-porn_n_4401064.html [https://perma.cc/KMJ9-E2AE].
72. Id.
73. See Gail Dines, The HIV Crisis in the Porn Industry, COUNTERPUNCH (Sept. 27,
2013, 1:11 AM), https://www.counterpunch.org/2013/09/27/the-hiv-crisis-in-the-porn-in
dustry [https://perma.cc/Q5ND-NA6U]; see also Sherry Yates Young, HIV scare in porn
industry after 2 actors test positive, CBS NEWS (Dec. 30, 2014, 4:29 PM), http://www.cbs
news.com/news/hiv-scare-in-porn-industry-after-2-actors-test-positive [https://perma.cc
/86RL-MKNZ].
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wasn’t wearing a condom.74 However, in February 2016, California’s
Division of Occupational Safety and Health rejected the proposal that
would have “required actors in all pornographic films [in its state]
to use condoms.” 75
HIV is not the only disease performers must be afraid of, how-
ever. According to a 2012 study, twenty-eight percent of performers
tested positive for chlamydia and/or gonorrhea.76 One male performer
surmised that “[e]very professional in the porn-world has herpes,
male or female.” 77 Despite the estimate that at least sixty-six per-
cent of performers have herpes, pornographers don’t test for herpes
in the way that they test for other sexually transmitted diseases.78
One former performer, Shelley Lubben, said that the performers
were often sent to fraudulent doctors clinics in order to obtain the
clean bill of health they needed to continue filming.79 Additionally,
many performers alter the results from their tests.80
As Ann Bartow has noted, pornography is different from other
types of materials that copyright law protects.81 With other harmful
materials, the harm is related to the end use, such as the instructions
for building a bomb.82 “With pornography, however, simply ‘produc-
ing’ the ‘information’ can inflict emotional or physical damages on
living humans . . . .” 83
II. PORNOGRAPHY’S RELIANCE ON COPYRIGHT LAW FOR ITS
COMMERCIAL SUCCESS
Despite the questionable means by which pornography is often
created, the pornography industry enjoys great commercial success.
74. Dines, supra note 73.
75. April Dembosky, Should Porn Stars Use Condoms? California Grapples With
Regulation, NPR (Feb. 18, 2016, 11:03 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots
/2016/02/18/467132549/should-porn-stars-use-condoms-california-grapples-with-regula
tion [https://perma.cc/EN43-3D64]; see California workplace safety board rejects mandatory
condoms for porn actors, supra note 70. Representatives of the pornography industry
argued that use of condoms would disinterest its consumers and force the industry to
operate underground, further endangering performers. Dembosky, supra.
76. Dembosky, supra note 75.
77. COVENANT EYES, supra note 16, at 6.
78. Van Maren, supra note 64.
79. See id.
80. Id.
81. See Ann Bartow, Some Peer-to-Peer, Democratically, and Voluntarily-Produced
Thoughts, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 449, 456 (2007) (reviewing YOCHAI BENKLER,
THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND
FREEDOM (2006)).
82. Id.
83. Id.
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It is estimated that in the U.S. alone, the pornography industry gen-
erates around $10–$13 billion yearly.84 Across the world, the industry’s
estimated worth is $97 billion.85 Pornography accounts for approxi-
mately “30 percent of all data transferred across the Internet.”86 Addi-
tionally, pornography websites receive more visitors each month than
Netflix, Amazon, and Twitter combined.87 Even many Fortune 500
companies have not been able to resist the industry because of the
money to be made. These companies include Time Warner (through
its subsidiary HBO), General Motors (through its subsidiary DirecTV),
Verizon, and Marriott, who make substantial portions of their profit
by streaming pornography.88
Without copyright protection, the pornography industry would
not experience its current profits because its works could be freely
taken by others.89 The Supreme Court described copyright as an
“engine of free expression,” and, as Ned Snow noted, “[it] plays a
critical role in bringing ideas into the free-speech marketplace.” 90
Therefore, copyright currently plays a role in bringing pornography
into the marketplace. This means that copyright also serves as a cata-
lyst to the social and physical harms that are caused by pornography.
With copyright protection, pornography companies can bring
infringement suits against alleged infringers.91 These infringers may
include “Bulletin Board services, usenet groups, and even browser
companies [in order] to prevent the unauthorized uploading, hosting,
and downloading of images [to] which [the pornographers have]
84. Scott Macaulay, The Internet Killed the Adult Movie Star?, FILMMAKER MAG.
(June 2, 2007), http://f ilmmakermagazine.com/2868-the-internet-killed-the-adult-movie
-star/#.Wbrst8iGPIV [https://perma.cc/9YPM-6V5V] (stating the estimate by Paul Fishbein,
president of Adult Video News Media Network, of 13 billion dollars); Porn Industry Feel-
ing Upbeat About 2014, NBC NEWS (Jan. 14, 2014, 5:54 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com
/business/business-news/porn-industry-feeling-upbeat-about-2014-n9076 [https://perma
.cc/CD97-HNDE] (estimating 10 to 12 billion dollars in revenue); Things Are Looking Up
in America’s Porn Industry, NBC NEWS (Jan. 20, 2015, 8:17 AM), https://www.nbcnews
.com/business/business-news/things-are-looking-americas-porn-industry-n289431
[https://perma.cc/T7XP-FMFV] (estimating 10 to 12 billion dollars in revenue).
85. Things Are Looking Up in America’s Porn Industry, supra note 84.
86. Porn Sites Get More Visitors Each Month Than Netflix, Amazon And Twitter
Combined, HUFFINGTON POST (May 4, 2013, 10:45 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/2013/05/03/internet-porn-stats_n_3187682.html [https://perma.cc/WJY4-RTYA].
87. Id.
88. See NAT’L CTR. ON SEXUAL EXPLOITATION, THE 2016 DIRTY DOZEN LIST, http://
endsexualexploitation.org/wp-content/uploads/DD_2016_Flyer_FINAL.pdf [https://perma
.cc/U64D-2J3M]; Porn Profits: Corporate America’s Secret, ABC NEWS (Jan. 28, 2017),
http://abcnews.go.com/Primetime/story?id=132001&page=1 [https://perma.cc/HSV7-YQ7K].
89. See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890, 893 (2012).
90. Id. at 890; Ned Snow, Content-Based Copyright Denial, 90 IND. L.J. 1473, 1474
(2015).
91. Ann Bartow, Copyright Law and Pornography, 91 OR. L. REV. 1, 3, 50–51 (2012).
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copyrights.” 92 Most recently, pornography producer Malibu Media
has begun a large series of litigation against alleged infringers by
tracking individuals’ Internet Protocol (IP) addresses.93 The individ-
uals who are targeted for litigation use:
BitTorrent [technology which] is a peer-to-peer file-sharing
protocol that allows users to transfer large files over the internet
by breaking the complete file (the “Seed”) into small pieces to be
downloaded in parts. Other users (“Peers”) download a small
“torrent” file that contains an index of the pieces and directions
for connecting to the Seed. When Peers connect to the Seed, they
download pieces of the file at random, and begin sharing each
piece once it has completed downloading. After all the pieces are
downloaded, the BitTorrent software reassembles the pieces into
a complete file for the Peer to view.94
Since “BitTorrent ‘tracks’ the pieces of a file as it is shared, so Peers
can identify the IP addresses from which the file was downloaded,”95
once Malibu Media has obtained the IP addresses of alleged infringers,
it files lawsuits in federal courts across the country against those
individual IP addresses96 as John Doe defendants.97 Once in court,
92. Id. at 50.
93. E.g., Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, No. 15 Civ. 4369(AKH), 2015 WL 4092417, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2015).
94. Id.
95. Id. at *2.
96. In re Malibu Media Copyright Infringement Litig., No. C 15-04170 WHA, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31908, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2016). (stating that Malibu must f ile
individual claims against each John Doe defendant it wishes to sue). Id. at *2–3, *6–8.
This is because the Northern District of California recently disapproved of the litigation
scheme commonly used by Malibu and other pornographers. See id. at *6–8 (quoting
Malibu Media, LLC v. Does 1 through 10, No 2:12-cv-3623-ODW(PJWx), 2012 WL
5382304, at *3–4 (C.D. Cal. June 27, 2012), vacated on other grounds by Malibu Media
LLC v. Doe, No. 2:12-cv-01642-RGK-SSx, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95487, at *1 (C.D. Cal.
July 10, 2012)). This scheme involved “su[ing] numerous John Does in a single action”
with minimal cost—only “a single f iling fee, [some] discovery, and stamps.” Id. at *7
(quoting Malibu Media, LLC v. Does 1 through 10, 2012 WL 5382304, at *3). Then,
because nearly every John Doe would settle for “nuisance-value” to avoid the embar-
rassment of a lawsuit for infringing pornographic works, pornographers would reap
hundreds of thousands of dollars in rewards. Id. The Northern District of California
positively noted the Central District of California’s position that “[b]y requiring Malibu
to f ile separate lawsuits for each of the Doe Defendants, Malibu will have to expend
additional resources to obtain a nuisance-value settlement—making this type of litigation
less profitable.” See id. at *6–8.
97. See, e.g., Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, No. 1:15-cv-01943-AWI-SKO, 2016 WL
1046934, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2016); Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, No. JKB-16-0647,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34040, at *1 (D.MD. Mar. 14, 2016); Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe,
No. 16-942 (KM)(MAH), 2016 WL 952340, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 14, 2016); Malibu Media
LLC v. Doe, No. 13 C 6312, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14798, *1–2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 2016);
Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, No. 1:15 CV 1342, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150388, at *1–2
(N.D. Ohio Nov. 5, 2015).
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Malibu can usually successfully subpoena a third party in order to
obtain the real names and addresses of the John Doe defendants.98
Cases such as these rarely go to trial. The Northern District of
California approved of the description of the litigation strategy used
by Malibu and other pornographers as “essentially an extortion
scheme” in which the “plaintiff has no intention of [actually] bring-
ing [the case] to trial.” 99 Armed with the threat of a legitimate copy-
right infringement claim exposing the defendants’ pornography use,
pornographers force “quick and lucrative settlements.”100
Without copyright protection, the billion dollar profits of the
pornography industry would plummet. If pornographic works could
be freely copied, pornographers would not sell as many copies.
Furthermore, without copyright protection, they would be unable to
threaten the copiers with copyright infringement lawsuits and force
their lucrative settlements.101 Therefore, withdrawing copyright
protection from pornographic works would disincentivize the por-
nographers who produce it.102
III. THE LAW’S CURRENT JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PORNOGRAPHY
The Copyright Act gives protection to pornography.103 Moreover,
obscenity is currently not a defense to copyrightability.104 Should the
98. See, e.g., Malibu Media, 2016 WL 1046934, at *1 (granting pornographer’s
“motion for leave to serve a third-party subpoena” to determine the identity of an indi-
vidual who “alleged[ly] . . . used the BitTorret [sic] file distribution network to download
[copyrighted pornography]”); Malibu Media, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34040, at *1–3; Malibu
Media, 2016 WL 952340, at *1.
99. See In re Malibu Media Copyright Infringement Litig., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
31908, at *7.
100. Bartow, supra note 91, at 51.
101. Id.
102. It should be noted that my proposal to withdraw copyright protection from ob-
scene works is not intended to solve the problem of revenge pornography. Revenge
pornography is pornography where the subject was either unaware that the expression
was being f ixed in a tangible work (i.e., f ilmed) or where the subject was aware but did
not intend for the distribution of the work. Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks,
Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 346 (2014); Kaitlan M.
Folderauer, Not All is Fair (Use) in Love and War: Copyright Law and Revenge Porn, 44
U. BALT. L. REV. 321, 325–27 (2015); Amanda Levendowski, Using Copyright to Combat
Revenge Porn, 3 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 422, 424–25 (2014). As the name
suggests, the purpose of revenge pornography is to humiliate, embarrass, and socially
harm the subject; the purpose is not to obtain economic gain for the distributor. See
Folderauer, supra, at 321–23, 325. For that reason, withdrawing the economic incentives
provided by copyright law will not have an effect on the production of revenge pornography.
See id. at 330–31. For proposals on how to solve the problem of revenge pornography, see,
e.g., id. at 334–35; Levendowski, supra, at 439; Keats Citron & Franks, supra, at 386–90.
103. Bartow, supra note 91, at 5–6, 11–13, 19–20.
104. Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 854 (5th Cir.
1979).
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Copyright Act be amended to create an exception to copyrightability
for obscene works, such an exception should be consistent with First
Amendment obscenity law. This is because a denial of copyright
protection could constitute a violation of the First Amendment.105
A. The Copyright Act
The federal government’s power to grant copyright protection
under the Copyright Act stems from the Progress Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.106 The Progress Clause states in relevant part that
“Congress shall have [the] Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries . . . .”107
Based on that authority, the Copyright Act grants protection to
“original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of ex-
pression.”108 The threshold required for a work to be considered
original is very low, and absent direct copying, pornographic works
meet this low threshold.109 The second requirement, that the work
be fixed in a tangible medium of expression, is met by pornographic
works since they are filmed.110
Obscenity is not a defense to copyrightability.111 This was first
stated by the Fifth Circuit in Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema
Adult Theater.112 The Fifth Circuit first reasoned that the language
of the Copyright Act was “facially all-inclusive” since there is no “hint”
in the language of the Act that obscene works should not be given
protection.113 Moreover, the Court reasoned that the legislative his-
tory of the 1976 Act revealed that Congress intended to avoid con-
tent restrictions on copyrightability.114 This reasoning has since been
105. Cf. Levendowski, supra note 102, at 438 (discussing the difficulty in crafting laws
regarding revenge porn).
106. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
107. Id.
108. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (current through Pub. L. No. 115-61).
109. See Feist Public’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 358–59 (1991) (“[T]he
originality requirement is not particularly stringent. A compiler may settle upon a se-
lection or arrangement that others have used; novelty is not required. . . . Presumably,
the vast majority of compilations will pass this test . . . .” ).
110. § 102(a). Under the Copyright Act, “[w]orks of authorship include . . . motion
pictures and other audiovisual works . . . .” Id. § 102(a)(6).
111. E.g., Mitchell Bros. Film Grp. v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 854 (5th
Cir. 1979).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 855. The Fifth Circuit argued that the intent of Congress in creating the 1976
Act was to continue the policy of the 1909 Act which “[did] not include requirements of
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adopted by the Ninth Circuit,115 the D.C. Circuit,116 the Seventh
Circuit,117 and many district courts.118 However, this is not a settled
issue, and some judges “have reached different conclusions on th[e]
issue.”119
My proposal will suggest an amendment to the Copyright Act
that makes obscenity a defense to copyrightability, thereby overrul-
ing the Fifth Circuit in Mitchell Bros. However, such an exception
to copyrightability must not be overbroad but rather, as discussed
below, must be consistent with the First Amendment.
B. The First Amendment
The First Amendment becomes important to this discussion
because a denial of copyright protection could well constitute an
abridgment of the First Amendment. This idea is currently disputed
among scholars120 and deserves its own paper, rather than the brief
analysis here. However, I will briefly outline the arguments and con-
clude that even if a denial of copyright protection could violate the
First Amendment, my proposal is consistent with First Amendment
obscenity law. Therefore, regardless of the answer to this question,
my proposed amendment would not violate the First Amendment.
Proponents of the view that a denial of copyright protection
violates the First Amendment, as recently articulated by Professor
novelty, ingenuity, or esthetic merit, and there is no intention to enlarge the standard of
copyright protection to require them.” Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 51).
115. Dream Games of Ariz., Inc. v. PC Onsite, 561 F.3d 983, 991 (9th Cir. 2009); Jartech,
Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir. 1982).
116. Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
1448 (1982).
117. Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, 689 F.3d 754, 755–56 (7th Cir. 2012).
118. Malibu Media, LLC v. Benson, No. 13-cv-02394-WYD-MEH, 2014 WL 2859618,
at *3–4 (D. Colo. June 20, 2014); Malibu Media, LLC v. Zumbo, No. 2:13-cv-729-JES-
DNF, 2014 WL 2742830, at *4 (M.D. Fla. June 17, 2014); Nova Prods., Inc. v. Kisma
Video, Inc., Nos. 02 Civ. 3850(HB), 02 Civ. 6277(HB), 03 Civ. 3379(HB), 2004 WL
2754685, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2004); Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., No. C78-
679A, 1981 WL 1402, at *9 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 24, 1981) (applying the Mitchell Bros.
reasoning to the fair use defense); see Malibu Media, LLC v. Does 1–6, No. 12 C 08903,
291 F.R.D. 191, 198 (N.D. Ill. 2013).
119. Malibu Media, LLC v. Does 1–28, No. 12-cv-12598, 2012 WL 7748917, at *10
(E.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2012) (quoting Next Phase Distribution, Inc. v. Does 1–27, 284
F.R.D. 165, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)), vacated as moot by Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35893, at *1–2 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 15, 2013); see also Devils Films, Inc.
v. Nectar Video, 29 F. Supp. 2d 174, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“Once a court has determined
that copyright[able] material is obscene, there seems no reason to require it to expend
its resources on behalf of a plaintiff who it could as readily be trying for a violation of the
federal criminal law.”).
120. See Snow, supra note 90.
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Ned Snow, reason that copyright denial “would enable Congress to
influence content” in the free-speech marketplace, thereby violating
the First Amendment.121 This is because “[a]bsent the money that
copyright provides to speakers, much content would simply never be
spoken.”122 The Supreme Court has recognized that economic com-
pensation is a significant incentive to produce expression.123 There-
fore, as Snow argues, “removing copyright introduces a practical
likelihood of silencing speakers.”124
On the contrary, opponents of this view reason that copyright
denial would not deny speakers a market for their expression but
would merely deny them a monopoly advantage in the market,125
therefore not violating the First Amendment. They believe that at
the heart of the First Amendment is the right to speak what a person
wishes, not to obtain an economic incentive for that speech.126 Some
scholars, such as Ann Bartow, have assumed this to be the case when
proposing that copyright law should not protect some pornography;
Bartow argued that “[t]he government would not be silencing pornog-
raphers; [but] would simply be reducing the economic incentives
copyright laws provide them . . . .”127 I, however, will assume that
content-based copyright denials have the potential to violate the First
Amendment and will therefore discuss obscenity laws under the First
Amendment as stated by the Supreme Court in Miller v. California.128
C. Miller v. California
In Miller, the Supreme Court held that “obscene material is un-
protected by the First Amendment.”129 Specifically, it held that “hard
121. Id. at 1479–80.
122. Id. at 1479.
123. United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 457, 468–70 (1995)
(holding that the Speech Clause extended to protection to f inancial incentives to produce
speech).
124. Snow, supra note 90, at 1480; see also Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of
N.Y. Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991) (“[T]he government’s ability to impose
content-based burdens on speech raises the specter that the government may effectively
drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.”).
125. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 352–53 (1989).
126. C. Edwin Baker, Essay, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV.
891, 903 (2002) (“Freedom of speech gives a person a right to say what she wants. It does
not give the person a right to charge a price for the opportunity to hear or receive her
speech.”); Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees
of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1203 (1970) (“The first amendment guar-
antees the right to speak; it does not offer a governmental subsidy for the speaker . . . .”).
127. Bartow, supra note 91, at 5, 52.
128. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36–37 (1973).
129. Id. at 23.
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core” pornography, as could be defined by states or Congress, does
not receive protection.130 At issue in Miller was the application of
California’s criminal obscenity statute when the appellant Miller
distributed sexually explicit materials in a mass mailing to individ-
uals who had not solicited the materials.131
The Supreme Court first reaffirmed its prior holding in Roth v.
United States that “obscenity is not within the area of constitution-
ally protected speech or press.”132 However, the Court then rejected
its previous test for obscenity in the plurality decision of Memoirs v.
Massachusetts.133 In Memoirs, three justices articulated a three-part
test for obscenity: “(a) the dominant theme of the material taken as
a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is pa-
tently offensive because it affronts contemporary community stan-
dards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters;
and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value.”134
The Miller Court took issue with the third element, which re-
quires that the material be utterly without redeeming social value.135
The Supreme Court reasoned that since this prong of the test re-
quired “the prosecution to prove a negative,” it was “a burden virtu-
ally impossible to discharge under our criminal standards of proof.”136
Therefore, it should be “abandoned as unworkable.”137
For that reason, the new test articulated by the Supreme Court
in Miller altered the third element, making the test:
(a) [W]hether “the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards” would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest . . . ; (b) whether the work depicts
or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct . . .; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.138
By way of example, the Supreme Court provided what it deemed
were “a few plain examples” of what could be regulated within this
130. Id. at 24, 27–29.
131. Id. at 17–18. The materials at issue included “brochures [that] advertise[d] four
books entitled ‘Intercourse,’ ‘Man-Woman,’ ‘Sex Orgies Illustrated,’ and ‘An Illustrated
History of Pornography,’ and a f ilm entitled ‘Marital Intercourse.’ ” Id. at 18. The bro-
chures contained drawings of men and women explicitly engaging in various sexual acts,
with genitals often prominently displayed. Id.
132. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957); Miller, 413 U.S. at 23.
133. Miller, 413 U.S. at 23.
134. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 415, 418 (1966) (plurality opinion).
135. Miller, 413 U.S. at 21–23.
136. Id. at 22.
137. Id. at 23.
138. Id. at 24.
4
PORNOGRAPHY AND GENDER INEQUALITY 285
new definition of obscenity, specifically, what constitutes “patently
offensive” under the second prong.139 This could include: “(a) [p]atently
offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts,
normal or perverted, actual or simulated[;] (b) [p]atently offensive
representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions,
and lewd exhibition of the genitals.”140
The Court acknowledged the difficulty in defining such “hard
core” pornographic materials that it sought to isolate from protec-
tion.141 However, “[i]f the inability to define regulated materials
with ultimate, god-like precision altogether removes the power of
the States or the Congress to regulate, then ‘hard core’ pornography
may be exposed without limit . . . .”142 The Court reiterated that the
heart of this test is that “[a]t a minimum, prurient, patently offen-
sive depiction or description of sexual conduct must have serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value to merit First Amend-
ment protection.”143
The most prominent example of a law that was deemed too
broad and outside the limits of Miller’s obscenity test was the city
ordinance at issue in American Booksellers Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut.144
The anti-pornography ordinance in this case was drafted by femi-
nists Andrea Dworkin and Catherine MacKinnon for the City of
Minneapolis.145 The ordinance described pornography as:
[T]he graphic sexually explicit subordination of women, whether
in pictures or in words, that also includes one or more of the
following:
(1) Women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain or
humiliation; or
(2) Women are presented as sexual objects who experience
sexual pleasure in being raped; or
(3) Women are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up or
mutilated or bruised or physically hurt, or as dismembered
or truncated or fragmented or severed into body parts; or
(4) Women are presented as being penetrated by objects or
animals; or
139. Id. at 25.
140. Id.
141. Miller, 413 U.S. at 27–28.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 26.
144. American Booksellers Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 324–25 (7th Cir. 1985),
aff’d, Hudnut v. American Booksellers Ass’n, Inc. No. 85-1090, 1986 U.S. LEXIS 166, at
*1 (Feb. 24, 1986).
145. E.R. Shipp, A Feminist Offensive Against Exploitation, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 1984),
http://www.nytimes.com/1984/06/10/weekinreview/a-feminist-offensive-against-ex
ploitation.html?mcubz=3 [https://perma.cc/WPG5-F9SQ].
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(5) Women are presented in scenarios of degradation, injury,
abasement, torture, shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding,
bruised, or hurt in a context that makes these conditions
sexual; or
(6) Women are presented as sexual objects for domination, con-
quest, violation, exploitation, possession, or use, or through
postures or positions of servility or submission or display.146
The ordinance also provided that “the ‘use of men, children, or
transsexuals in the place of women in paragraphs (1) through (6)
above shall also constitute pornography under this section.’ ”147
This ordinance was deemed unconstitutional by the Seventh
Circuit because it was considerably different from the Supreme
Court’s definition of obscenity in Miller.148 The court noted that the
“ordinance d[id] not refer to the prurient interest, to offensiveness,”
or to “whether the work ha[d] literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.”149 Rather, the ordinance sought to regulate works that in-
fluence attitudes about women, regardless of whether the work has
any other value.150 The Seventh Circuit took issue with the fact that
this made the ordinance much broader than the Supreme Court’s
definition of obscenity.151 Absent obscene material, the government
is not free to regulate ideas, no matter how harmful or distasteful.152
For example, “[t]he ideas of the Klan may be propagated,” “[c]ommu-
nists may speak freely and run for office,” and “[t]he Nazi Party may
march through a city with a large Jewish population.”153 Regulating
speech in this manner because it is distasteful without a finding of
obscenity would violate the First Amendment.154
The lesson to be learned from Hudnut is that obscenity laws
must not be overbroad but must be consistent with the intent of Miller
in order to be deemed constitutional.
IV. CONGRESS SHOULD AMEND THE COPYRIGHT ACT TO EXCLUDE
OBSCENE MATERIALS USING AN OBJECTIVE TEST
Since the First Amendment does not protect obscene materials,
copyright law is not required to protect obscene materials either.
146. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 324.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 324–25.
150. Id. at 325.
151. See id. at 324–25, 328–29, 331.
152. See Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 327–28.
153. Id. at 328 (internal citations omitted).
154. See id. at 324–25.
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Given the harmful effects that pornography causes, this Article
posits that obscene materials should indeed not be given copyright
protection. This Part first proposes that the Copyright Act should be
amended to exclude obscene materials from protection. Second, this
Part analyzes the intent of the Miller test so the amendment may be
crafted in a way that will not violate free speech concerns. Finally,
this Part sets forth an objective version of the Miller test. The ad-
vantage to an objective version of the test is that it may be easily
and cleanly applied by courts.155 The effect will be that many porno-
graphic works will be denied copyright protection, stripping away the
incentive to produce it. This proposal is intended to be a test that
can be applied to filmed pornography rather than still images.156
First, an amendment by Congress to exclude obscene material
would solve the debate over whether obscenity should serve as a de-
fense to copyrightability.157 This would effectively overrule the Fifth
Circuit’s decision in Mitchell Bros. and the subsequent followings by
the Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits.158 An amendment by Congress
is preferable here since there seems to be confusion among the courts
as to whether the Fifth Circuit should continue to be followed.159 In
2012, the confusion only intensified with the Northern District of
California’s decision in Wong v. Hard Drive Prods., Inc.160 In Wong,
plaintiff Liuxia Wong filed a motion for declaratory judgment based
on the theory that she did not infringe on defendant Hard Drive
Productions (HDP) copyright because their materials were obscene
and therefore not copyrightable.161 She was accused by HDP of
downloading copyrighted pornographic images.162 The Northern Dis-
trict of California accepted Wong and defendant’s stipulated judg-
ment but issued only a one-sentence judgment.163 This decision seems
155. The obscenity test contained in Miller has been criticized for being overly vague,
subjective, and diff icult to apply. See, e.g., P. Heath Brockwell, Comment, Grappling
with Miller v. California—The Search for an Alternative Approach to Regulating Obscenity,
24 CUMB. L. REV. 131, 131, 133, 135–37, 141, 144–45 (1994). An amendment to the Copy-
right Act that includes a version of the Miller test should be in an objective framework
to avoid the problems present with the current Miller test.
156. See supra note 10.
157. See supra notes 121–28 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 112–17 and accompanying text.
159. See Malibu Media, LLC v. Does 1–28, No. 12-cv-12598, 2012 WL 7748917, at *10
(E.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2012); Devils Films, Inc. v. Nectar Video, 29 F. Supp. 2d 174, 176
(S.D.N.Y. 1998).
160. Stipulated J. at 1, Wong v. Hard Drive Prods., Inc., No. C 12-00469 YGR (N.D.
Cal. May 31, 2012).
161. See Pl.’s First Am. Compl. at 1, 13, Wong v. Hard Drive Prods., Inc., 2012 WL
384870 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2012), No. 5:12-cv-00469-HRL.
162. Id. at 2, 4–5, 9–10.
163. Stipulated J. at 1, Wong v. Hard Drive Prods., Inc., No. C 12-00469 YGR (N.D.
Cal. May 31, 2012).
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to imply that the court accepted Wong’s argument that obscene
material cannot be copyrightable.
Congress should choose to clarify this ambiguity in favor of de-
nying obscene works copyright protection because of the harms that
pornography inflicts on gender equality. Congress should recognize
that this amendment to copyright law would serve as a means by
which to disincentivize pornographers. As set forth in Section I.A, not
only is pornography harmful to society, since it promotes the degra-
dation and subordination of women, but pornography also fuels the
demand for prostitution and trafficking since the individual pieces
of the sex industry function in conjunction with one another.164
Stated differently, since the First Amendment does not protect
obscene material, it is not necessary for copyright to protect obscene
material either. And, given the harmful effects that pornography
causes, copyright should indeed not protect such obscene materials.
This amendment must be consistent with the intent of the
Supreme Court in Miller to the extent that a denial of copyright
protection would violate the First Amendment.165 In Miller, the
Supreme Court was predominately concerned that “[a]t a minimum,
prurient, patently offensive depiction or description of sexual con-
duct must have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value
to merit First Amendment protection.”166 This is evident since the
Court specifically altered the third prong of the existing obscenity
test from Memoirs, which required that “the material [be] utterly
without redeeming social value.”167 Instead, the Supreme Court re-
quired that the work lack “serious literary, artistic, political, or sci-
entific value.”168 This test was specifically intended to isolate “hard
core” pornography from First Amendment protection.169
Unless the Copyright Act’s test for obscenity tracks with and is
consistent with Miller, it will likely be held unconstitutional, as was
the city ordinance in Hudnut.170 The mistake of the ordinance in
Hudnut was that it was broader than the Miller test.171 The Seventh
Circuit criticized the ordinance because it made no mention of pru-
rient interest, offensiveness, or literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.172 For that reason, the intent of each prong of the Miller test
164. See supra Sections I.A, I.B.
165. See supra Section III.B.
166. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 26 (1973).
167. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966) (plurality opinion).
168. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
169. Id. at 29.
170. See American Booksellers Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 324–26, 328 (7th
Cir. 1985).
171. See supra notes 144–53 and accompanying text.
172. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 324–25.
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should be analyzed and incorporated into a test that would pass
constitutional muster.
After each factor from Miller is analyzed, I will attempt to
rework them into an objective framework. The reason for this is to
ensure that the test can be easily and consistently applied by judges
to various works in order to determine if the work is copyrightable.
The first prong of the Miller test requires that the average per-
son would find that the work, taken as a whole, “appeals to the pru-
rient interest.”173 The Supreme Court had already defined appeal to
the prurient interest as that which “ha[s] a tendency to excite lustful
thoughts.”174 In other words, the work as a whole is sexually arous-
ing to the average person. “Generally, pornography appeals to the
prurient interests because it is designed to arouse lustful thoughts
in its audience.”175
The second prong of the Miller test requires that the work
depict “sexual conduct in a patently offensive way.”176 The Court
noted that examples of such patently offensive conduct could include
“[p]atently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate
sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated,” or “[p]atently
offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory
functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals.”177 Again, given the
Court’s example, it appears that it intended most hard core pornog-
raphy to easily meet this prong.
The Court’s third prong of the test is what separates hard core
pornographic works from other works that may contain some pruri-
ently appealing, patently offensive material. The third prong of the
Miller test requires that “the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”178 Even though the
Supreme Court later stated that this inquiry should be made from
the reasonable person standard,179 the requirement is, nonetheless,
extremely subjective. What one person may deem to lack serious
artistic value may be seen as innovative by another.
My proposed test for obscenity combines the first two prongs of
the test into a definition of pornography. If the work meets this
definition of pornography, it will automatically be deemed to have
173. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (internal citation omitted).
174. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487, 487 n.20 (1957).
175. United States v. McCoy, 937 F. Supp. 2d 1374, 1379 (M.D. Ga. 2013). This is also
consistent with the idea that obscenity law was created to apply only to sexual materials.
See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 792–94 (2011); United States v.
Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 479–80 (2010).
176. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
177. Id. at 25.
178. Id. at 24.
179. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 499–501 (1987).
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prurient appeal and depict sexual acts in a patently offensive way.
Once this definition is met, the work will be subject to the scrutiny
of a second step which uses an objective factor as a proxy for whether
the work lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
The first step of my test seeks to determine if the work is that
which the Supreme Court in Miller would have thought to constitute
hard core pornography. Borrowing from the Court’s language in
Miller, I propose that pornography be defined as a work which con-
tains actual or simulated sexual acts, masturbation, excretory func-
tions, or open exhibition of genitals. “Sexual acts” can further be
defined as either vaginal, anal, or oral sex. This definition would
not violate the First Amendment because it is directly in line with
what the Supreme Court considered to be patently offensive.180 Fur-
thermore, the requirement that the work appeal to a prurient interest
is present here since, as the Supreme Court noted, pornographic
works are intended to “hav[e] a tendency to excite lustful thoughts.”181
This initial step should be applied broadly and without a subjective
analysis; the work either contains pornographic content, or it does not.
Once a work is considered “pornography,” it must be subject to
a determination if the work as a whole lacks serious literary, artis-
tic, political, or scientific value.182 An objective way to accomplish
this inquiry is to use time. The Supreme Court’s instruction that the
work need be taken as a whole183 implies that just because a work
180. It should be noted that the Supreme Court held that the “prurient interest” and
“patently offensive” prongs of the test should be applied using a local, community standard
rather than a national standard. Miller, 413 U.S. at 30–34. This encourages an even
greater deal of subjectivity and has been widely criticized for its diff iculty to apply,
particularly in the Internet Age. This is because it is diff icult to define what community
standards should apply to obscene materials that were transferred over a large
geographic area via the Internet. See generally Debra D. Burke, Cybersmut and the First
Amendment: A Call for a New Obscenity Standard, 9 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 87, 88, 96–97,
100, 105, 107–13, 125 (1996); Patrick T. Egan, Note, Virtual Community Standards: Should
Obscenity Law Recognize the Contemporary Community Standard of Cyberspace?, 30
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 117, 121–22 (1996); J. Todd Metcalf, Note, Obscenity Prosecutions
in Cyberspace: The Miller Test Cannot “Go Where No [Porn] Has Gone Before,” 74 WASH.
U. L. Q. 481, 484–86, 494–95 (1996).
A national standard, rather than a community standard, for what appeals to prurient
interest and is patently offensive would also be more appropriate for the Copyright Act
since it is a federal statute that should be applied consistently and objectively. Contra
Miller, 413 U.S. at 27–34. However, even under the Supreme Court’s current rule, which
requires community standards to be applied, my proposed test does not violate that rule.
My definition of “pornography” which combines the f irst and second prongs of the Miller
test merely defines the hard core pornographic material that the Supreme Court thought,
at the very minimum, met these f irst two elements, regardless of what community
standard is applied. Therefore, under any community standard, material that meets my
definition of “pornography” both appeals to prurient interest and is patently offensive.
181. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (1957).
182. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 23–24, 27.
183. Id. at 23–24.
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may contain some of what I deem pornographic material, the work
should not automatically be considered obscene. Rather, as a whole,
this prong is intended to look for some artistic value in the work
that would remove it from the realm of obscenity.
Rather than forcing courts to determine what does and does not
constitute artistic value, courts should deem the portions of the work
that contain “pornographic” material, as I have defined it, to be ob-
scene, and the portions that do not contain “pornographic” material
to have artistic value. This is an easy way to come up with a per-
centage of the work that has artistic value. Since the work must be
taken as a whole,184 a court should balance the percentage of the
work that is obscene against the percentage of the work that has
artistic value. Congress should include in its amendment what
percentage of obscene material a work must have in order to lack
serious artistic value. In this way, timing percentages can serve as
a proxy for whether the work lacks serious artistic value.
Time is a better solution than judging artistic merit. Even the
Supreme Court has acknowledged the near impossibility of defining
terms such as obscenity and hard core pornography.185 Prior to Miller,
Justice Stewart declined to further define the term “hard-core por-
nography” and acknowledged that “perhaps [he] could never succeed
in intelligibly doing so.”186 Rather, Justice Stewart resorted to the
following test: “I know it when I see it . . . .”187 The subsequent
Miller test is no more helpful to judges since it also requires them to
subjectively judge artistic merit. Years later, Justice Scalia ex-
pressed his view that, while the third prong of the Miller test should
use a reasonable person standard, making “an objective assessment
of . . . artistic value” was nevertheless impossible.188
“I know it when I see it” jurisprudence is not a proper test to
determine what works should be given copyright protection. With-
out a clear standard, filmmakers will have no way of knowing if
their works will be given copyright protection until a judge has told
them. The result of this lack of certainty would be that filmmakers
would be hesitant to invest their economic resources into producing
a work if they have no way of knowing if that work will be protected
and, as a result, if they will be able to profit from their work. Also,
because what one judge may deem to have artistic value could be
viewed as wholly obscene by another judge, the decision of whether
184. Id.
185. See id. at 20–23.
186. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
187. Id.
188. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 504–05 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis
added) (“Just as there is no use arguing about taste, there is no use litigating about it.”).
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a work is given copyright protection is left completely to the subjec-
tive whim of one judge.
On the contrary, my proposed test leaves little ambiguity. Time
is a more appropriate test than artistic merit because filmmakers
will generally be able to tell if their work is eligible for copyright
protection. Furthermore, if a filmmaker is denied protection, they
will not have to suffer the frustration of knowing that perhaps a dif-
ferent judge would have seen the artistic value in their work. The
important decision of whether a piece of work is granted protection
should not be left to the subjective whims of judges. For that reason,
a test that uses time percentages would be more effective than artistic
merit because it can be consistently applied by courts.
A sufficient way for Congress to determine the minimum per-
centage of artistic material a work must contain in order to deserve
copyright protection would be to conduct studies into pornographic
works that it considers to be the hard core pornography described
in Miller. If, for example, it finds that in pornographic films, movies,
and clips, approximately seventy-five percent of the entire work
consists of obscene material, it could determine that when a work is
seventy-five percent obscene, it lacks serious artistic value. There-
fore, Congress would require that, in order to have serious artistic
value, a work must be at least twenty-five percent artistic. I will con-
tinue to use this number as an example.
Timing is an appropriate proxy for artistic value because the
more time of the work that is dedicated to nonobscene material could
be an indication that there is more artistic value in it, such as a story-
line or character development. Therefore, a film that is 120 minutes
long and contains several scenes of sexual acts or open exposure of
genitals amounting to thirty minutes of the film will not automati-
cally be considered obscene. Rather, the percentage of the work that
contains obscene material must be analyzed. Here, thirty minutes out
of 120 minutes are obscene. That means that only twenty-five percent
of the work is obscene and seventy-five percent of the work has artis-
tic value. Because seventy-five percent artistic is higher than the
twenty-five percent minimum in my example, the percentage of ob-
scene material will not be high enough for the work as a whole to be
considered obscene. Therefore, this work will be eligible for copy-
right protection.
On the contrary, a typical fifteen-minute clip on a pornographic
website that contains thirteen minutes of a mixture of oral and anal
sex performed on a woman would not have the same result. Thir-
teen minutes of the work are obscene and two minutes have artistic
value. Therefore, eighty-five percent of the work is obscene, and
fifteen percent has artistic value. Since fifteen percent artistic does
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not meet the twenty-five percent minimum, this work would be con-
sidered obscene and not eligible for copyright protection. Thus, my
proposal alleviates courts from having to get into the weeds of what
should be considered artistic value. Rather, this method may be
easily and consistently applied by courts.
Crafting an objective test as a proxy for what lacks serious ar-
tistic value is a difficult task. One may argue that if time is used,
pornographers will simply add “filler” material in order to meet the
copyright requirements. While this is a possibility, the requirement
would still force pornographers to introduce more artistic material
into their works, bringing it closer to achieving the Supreme Court’s
Miller test. Furthermore, one may argue that my proposal cannot be
efficiently applied by courts since it would require the entire work
to be viewed and dissected. While it is true that this could be time-
consuming, it is still a test that can, in the end, be cleanly applied.
Given the harmful effects of pornography and the great need for a
solution, this burden is not overly heavy on the courts.189
CONCLUSION
Copyright law does not have to protect obscene materials since
the First Amendment does not either.190 Given the harms that por-
nography causes,191 copyright should not protect such works. The
pornography industry relies on copyright protection to generate the
billions of dollars of profit every year. Without copyright protection,
pornographers would not have the incentive to produce pornographic
works because their works could be copied by others, greatly reducing
the amount of money they would be able to make. An amendment
to the Copyright Act that excludes obscene material would accom-
plish this, as long as the test for obscenity is consistent with the
First Amendment, as is my proposed amendment. Such an amend-
ment would be a step forward for gender equality. This proposal would
help the women who are forced and coerced into the sex industry,
since pornography drives the demand for prostitution and traffick-
ing.192 Furthermore, this proposal would be socially beneficial since
it would reduce the number of works which portray women as mere
sexual objects who are to be abused by and dominated over by men.
189. Additionally, it is certainly possible that portions of a work that I would deem
“pornographic” could actually be portrayed in an artistic fashion and be without any
harmful effects to gender equality. For that reason, a factor test may be more appropriate
so that works not meant to be targeted by this test are not accidentally stripped of
copyright protection. Congress should also consider any other objective factors that could
serve as a proxy for what lacks artistic value.
190. Miller, 413 U.S. at 23–24.
191. See supra Sections I.A, I.B.
192. See FARLEY, supra note 19, at 1.

